Landscape of Privacy and Security Countermeasures and Open Problems


Amina Bassit

IJCB Tutorial

September 15, 2024

Each Countermeasure approaches the trade-offs differently

Landscape of Existing Privacy and Security Countermeasures

3D Plot

Controllable Privacy Filter in Face Recognition


Controllable Privacy Filter in Face Recognition

    • Modality: face
    • Filter trained to control the amount of sensitive attributes to be remove
    • Application of the filter is fast but does not apply security controls
    • Trade-off:

Biometric template protection schemes


Bloom Filters-based biometric template protection scheme

PolyProtect biometric template protection scheme

    • Modality: face
    • Uses multivariate polynomials over user-specific secrets (exponents and coefficients)
    • High risk of reversibility for attackers accessing multiple templates of the same face.
    • Leaks soft biometric information [YKR+24]
    • Fast comparison
    • Trade-off:

Reflection on non-cryptographic Approaches

    • Fast because plaintext operations
    • Suffer from reversibility issues
    • Accuracy affected by the protection mechanism

The good news about Cryptographic Approaches



Accuracy is preserved

Privacy and security can be enhanced independently of accuracy

Secret sharing-based biometric template protection scheme

Protection of sensitive information using Homomorphic Encryption



Inner product as a practical similarity measure under encryption

Can we compute the inner product with few multiplications?

SIMD property of of Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)

FHE-based BTP scheme with one homomorphic multiplication

Enrollment Phase
Verification Phase
Inner Product Computation
    • Modality: face (or any fixed-length representation)
    • Inner product over normalized vectors.
    • Precision-based quantization.
    • Provable privacy and security
    • Runs one-to-one comparison in $31.22$ ms
    • Operates in the cleartext decision mode

Decision Modes in biometric recognition under encryption

Can we free the inner product from multiplication?

Pre-computed IP using a Lookup table-based comparator

FHE-based BTP scheme with zero homomorphic multiplication

    • Modality: face (or any fixed-length representation)
    • Inner product over normalized vectors.
    • Table-based quantization.
    • Permutations improves accuracy.
    • Provable privacy and security
    • Runs one-to-one comparison in $16.94$ ms
    • Operates in the cleartext and encrypted decision modes

Biometric verification decision Modes

Summary of Biometric verification solutions w.r.t. the trade-offs

Protected Biometric Search Solutions in the Literature


Packing Approaches for Biometric Search

    Analysis of the special case of #References = Ciphertext capacity

Can we run biometric search under encryption with few multiplications?

Addition of a Reference in HERS

[EJB22] HERS: Homomorphically Encrypted Representation Search

Search of a probe in HERS

[EJB22] HERS: Homomorphically Encrypted Representation Search

Can we free biometric search under encryption from multiplication?

Addition of a Reference in an MFIP-based search

[B23] Fast and accurate biometric search under encryption

Search of a probe in an MFIP-based search

[B23] Fast and accurate biometric search under encryption

Summary of FHE-based Search solutions



Computational complexity $\mathcal{O}\left( K \cdot \left( \#\mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{HE}} + \#\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{HE}} + \#\mathrm{A}_{\mathrm{HE}} \right) \right)$


There is room for improvement

Efficient Search with Dimensionality Reduction

    • Build upon DeepMDS for dimensionality reduction.

Effect of the dimensionality reduction on search runtime

Open Problem: End-to-end encrypted biometric recognition solution

AutoFHE shows that inference under encryption is feasible and demonstrates it on encrypted $32 \times 32$ images

Open Problem: Computation integrity check of biometrics under FHE

We trust BUT we do not verify
[BHV+21] Fast and accurate likelihood ratio-based biometric verification secure against malicious adversaries

Takeaways of this part